Woolf’s damaging report asks further questions of the “Libyan School of Economics”

The recently-released Woolf Report overshadowed the LSE’s announcement of a new Director of School, as problems from the last regime threatened to spill over into the next period of the School’s history.

The report, commissioned following the sudden resignation of Director Sir Howard Davies over his links to Libya, was released on Wednesday November 30.

The 188-page report documents the beginnings and gradual expansion of links between the LSE and the Gaddafi government. It starts with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s first failed attempt to attend the institution in 2001 and proceeds all the way to Colonel Gaddafi’s lecture by video-link in December 2010.

Professor Judith Rees, interim Director of the LSE, described the report as “forensic” but also admits in an interview released to alumni that “The report is very painful. It shows a catalogue of errors and misjudgements.” Rees pledged to implement the 15 policy recommendations proposed by Lord Woolf so that the new Director, Craig Calhoun, can start his tenure with a “clean slate.”

And yet, the manner of the release and the refusal by the University of London to publicly publish their report has raised concerns about the extent to which it will allow the LSE to “move on from this unhappy chapter,” as said by Professor Rees.

The Woolf Inquiry was launched last March to “establish the full facts of the School’s links to Libya.” Over the ensuing nine months, Lord Woolf conducted interviews and reviewed appropriate documents in order to provide possible recommendations to LSE Council “as soon as possible.”

Lord Woolf submitted the report with his recommendations on the 17^th October and according to an LSE spokesperson it was then placed “in a safe” until its publication on the 30^th November. The same spokesperson explained that this date was chosen for two reasons: (1) that it allowed the University of London to complete their investigation into the authenticity of Saif’s thesis and (2) it was also the day when all the members of LSE’s governing Council were present.

Despite the UoL Inquiry supposedly being the principal reason for delaying the release of the Woolf Report, the University of London has chosen not to publish its report, citing the Data Protection Act. The London Student asked a spokesperson for the University of London why they felt it necessary to publish the documents in tandem if one was to not be made available to the public? He responded that it “is entirely up to the LSE how they deal with the Woolf Report.”

As previously mentioned, the Woolf Report was released on Wednesday, November 30^th at 4pm; nearly one-month-and-a-half after it was completed and submitted. This date is also notable because it coincides with the largest UK public sector strike in 30 years, accompanied by mass student protests. These events dominated that night’s news coverage.

Responding to questions over the strategic nature of the release, an LSE spokesperson admitted that “it makes a great conspiracy theory” but was adamant that this was not the true rationale. Alex Peters-Day, General Secretary of LSE’s Students’ Union, conceded that the Press Department may be “strategic” but argued that nonetheless a broader culture change is taking place.

Peters-Day emphasised the School’s Fabian heritage and explained that the LSE had merely “lost its way.” She launched her “The Only Way Is Ethics Campaign” in response to this, and she is working to convince the University to divest from questionable sources of funding and to ensure transparency by publishing donations online in future. Peters-Day believes the LSE is at a fork in the road and she is optimistic about the direction the School is going in. In an interview, she told the London Student that “they’re not making any excuses at the Council.”

Other students and members of faculty interviewed did not seem to share Peters-Day’s sense of optimism. When asked about the problems posed by the Libya-debacle John Sidel, a Professor in the LSE International Relations Department said, “The problem is structural and deeply embedded in the culture of the School.” He went on to say that “I only hope that the Woolf Report and other ongoing discussions and initiatives at the LSE will lead to a strengthening of the integrity and independence of academic research at the School and to greater self-consciousness, self-confidence, and self-criticism in the School’s dealings with external donors.”

Interviewed the day after the Woolf Report was released, students on campus seemed largely unconcerned with the extent of the links between the LSE and Libya. Wee Jun Kai, student in the Economics and Management Department did not think the Inquiry would shock many people. He told the London Student that “Gaddafi is dead and the regime is gone.” In his view, being a global institution means that “sometimes you step on people’s toes.” He went on to say that, “being active [on the world stage] is better than not risking it.”  Neither was he concerned about a strategic press plan to downplay the report: “if it’s true it’s a smart thing to do.”

Many of his views were shared by Lola Jemibowon, student of Political Economy. She dismissed claims that the School’s reputation had been damaged by the whole affair, saying that “it doesn’t [damage its reputation] too much in the long run.”

Another student, Charlie, said that the impact of the report will be “pretty horrible” before going on to say that it amounts to “a slap in the face for the academic reputation of the LSE, especially as he [Saif] was rejected from Oxford.”

Woolf Report Findings

The Woolf Report included new revelations, confirmed some suspicions and documented much of what was already known. Lord Woolf’s central conclusion is that “there were shortcomings in the governance structure and management at the LSE.”  He split the ramifications of these shortcomings into three categories, Saif’s time at LSE, donations made to LSE, incidental links between Libya and LSE.

It was released that Saif originally applied to study at Oxford in 2002. His application was rejected because “his prior degree did not meet the requisite standard.” After subsequently being rejected by three LSE departments (Management, Government and Development), Saif was admitted into the Philosophy Department. To accomplish this he sought assistance from Professor McClennen in order to construct his application. McClennen then left the LSE to take up a job on Libya’s International Committee where he advised on constitutional reform. He describes the enrolment of Saif as “a very risky gamble.”

Even though Saif received the passing marks of 51 and 54 for his governance modules (the only modules he took outside of the Philosophy Department), his Master’s thesis was awarded a mark of 71. The higher thesis mark was the subject of some suspicion. Professor Mary Kaldor commented in 2003 that “although they reflect his ideas, I suspect he has had a lot of help.”

According to the Woolf Report, “Saif received a degree of assistance with his academic work far beyond that which would be available to most students… Some of the assistance Saif received remained concealed from those who taught him.”  At the time of writing his thesis Saif was supposedly very busy with other affairs. In one instance, he had to meet a Head of State the day before an exam so he decided to take one of his tutors, Professor Philipp Dorstewitz with him on his private jet.

In the first week of December 2008, six weeks after graduating and over seven months before his graduation ceremony, Saif was asked to donate to the LSE. The agreement was signed the day after his graduation ceremony to avoid the unwritten rule that money cannot be taken from current students.

The money was donated through the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Fund, a foundation which according to Lord Woolf was “undoubtedly Saif’s alter ego.” Prior to the agreement between the two parties, there was much wrangling in the LSE Council as well as in the Development Committee over the probity of the gift. Saif was asked to prove that the money originated from the private sector rather than the Libyan state.

Initially it was claimed that BP, British Gas and Shell donated money. This turned out to be and after the fact it was said that the money came from three undisclosed companies in Scotland, Italy and Turkey.

The Council was initially hesitant to accept the money, but after Sir Howard Davies bumped into Saif Gaddafi at Davos in early 2009, Davies sent a memo to Fiona Kirk asking to move the process along quicker.

Lord Woolf criticizes the LSE for not doing the necessary checks at this point. His report faults the Council for appointing Professor David Held to serve as the arbitrator on the evidence to be considered in accepting the donation. Held had a direct conflict of interest as he was co-Director of the Global Governance Centre which would receive the donation, in addition to the fact that he was “friend” to Saif as well as board member of Gaddafi’s Foundation.

Lord Woolf concludes: “The true source of the money which the LSE agreed to accept has never been established… there is a risk that the money was to come from payments made by private companies operating in Libya seeking to gain Saif’s favour and influence the award of contracts in Libya.”

One of the newest revelations is that Held was asked to leave the Board of Gaddafi’s Foundation in October 2009; however he remained on in an “advisory role”. Held was criticized by Lord Woolf as creating an “unfortunate perception.”

Additional criticism was levelled at Held for possibly linking Saif’s PhD grade to Saif’s willingness to meet a business associate. In an email to Saif, Held writes, “I have been monitoring closely the progress of your PhD. [The examiner] and I have had several discussions about it and I look forward to a positive resolution. In the meantime I am writing about a very important connection I would like to make for you.” The individual who Woolf refers to as “AB” then agreed to donate £1.39m to Held’s Centre for Global Governance over five years. AB was then awarded business in Libya.

The LSE also began to run a program called LSE Enterprise which was designed to train Libya’s future elite. Although no negative accusations are made, Woolf does say that indirectly, the orders which LSE-E obtained £2.2 million were dependent on Saif’s presence at the LSE.

The LSE Student’s Union held a meeting on the Thursday after the release to discuss with students their feelings and opinions on where the future should lead. Lukas Slothuus, Community and Welfare Officer, said in a statement that “LSE acted as a front for British foreign policy, not as a university. It was concerned mainly with upholding and forging close relations with the Gaddafi family rather than the proper running of the university. We demand that LSE gives full transparency in its financial dealings.”

The LSE Student’s Union held a meeting on the Thursday after the release of the report to discuss with students their feelings and opinions on where the future should lead. Lukas Slothuus, Community and Welfare Officer, said in a statement that “LSE acted as a front for British foreign policy, not as a university. It was concerned mainly with upholding and forging close relations with the Gaddafi family rather than the proper running of the university. We demand that LSE gives full transparency in its financial dealings.”

“1000s of students demanded full transparency through our Campaign launched in September this year (The Only Way is Ethics), and until we get that we cannot be satisfied. The management knowingly gambled with the good standing of the university. Students were fooled by disingenuous decisions and are now paying the price in years to come. The only way to make up for that is full transparency,” Slothuus added.

Echoing the sentiments of the student leaders, the Woolf Report concluded, “The errors…exceed those that should have occurred in an institution of LSE’s distinction.”